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Abstract: Competition and stability relationship have continued to be debated around the world with 
mixed results. Our mission is to test how this relationship subsist in SSA region commercial banks in 
the light of competition-stability and competition-fragility views using the generalised Methods of 
moment. We studied 440 commercial banks in 37 SSA countries over the periods of 2006-2015. The 
results provide evidences that support competition-fragility views over the study periods in the SSA 
region as we found Lerner index, our competition measure and score, the stability measure to be 
consistently strong and negatively related over the static and dynamic regression analysis that we 
carried out. While competition may be good as argued, and found in some other quarters, the policy 
implication of this study is for policy makers, regulators and practitioners alike to tread with caution in 
dealing with issues of competition given its potential to destabilise the system. 
Keywords: Competition; Stability; Generalised Method of Moments; Commercial Banks 
JEL Classification: G29 
 
1. Introduction 
A lot has been done in literature on the relationship between competition and 
stability. Yet not much have been done on this in Africa let alone the Sub-Sahara 
Africa region whether on regional or individual country basis3. Theoretical 
propositions argue competition affects stability of banks both through the charter 
value and the franchise value, but are far from reaching consensus regarding the 
direction of relationship. However, the main line of arguments has been across two 
divides; that competition could be good or bad for the banking system. It is good 
where competition enhances stability of the system, hence the competition stability 
view argument. On the other hand, competition is bad if its leads to distress in the 
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banking sector thereby causing the system to fail, this is in line with competition-
fragility views that argued that competition heightens banks incentives to take more 
risk which in turn threatens the stability of the system. Yet another view which is 
now gaining momentum in literature is the non-linear relationship between 
competition and stability theoretically modelled by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and 
have found in empirical literature1. 
The SSA region is underdeveloped and confronted with abject poverty. The financial 
system that is dominated by the banking system is also being nurtured. Given that 
competition in the banking system has the potential to drive other sectors of the 
economy, increase access to finance that could spur economic growth and improve 
on the lots of the region, there was the debate about increasing competition in this 
sector. While empirical work has chartered the course of dealing with issue of 
competition and especially as its borders on systemic stability in most regions of the 
world, no such work has focused on this region. This is the gap that this study wants 
to fill. 
The study therefore contributes to extant literature in two ways. Firstly, we use large 
datasets of commercial banks in 37 SSA region countries to test competition and 
stability relationship. This is the first of its kind. Again, based on the agitation for 
increasing competition in SSA region, this paper provide evidence to guide policy 
maker in dealing issues of competition and stability relationship. Our results thus 
provide evidence that support the competition fragility views over the study period 
as we found negative and significant relationship between competition, surrogate by 
Lerner index and stability rep- resent by z-score, consistently over the static and 
dynamic models. This provides a bit of caution for policy makers in dealing with 
issues of competition and stability in SSA region. Fu et al 2014 provided evidence 
to show that the recent financial crisis is a problem of excessive competition in the 
banking system. 
Going forward, the study is structured to capture the review of related literature that 
include both theoretical and empirical framework in Section 2. In Section 3 are 
contained the various methods adopted to arrive at the results in Section 4. While 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There is deluge of theoretical and empirical evidences on the relationship between 
competition and stability around the world. Yet specific literature telling the SSA 
region part of the story have been wanting. The perception about the relationship 
between competition and stability in the banking system align with the industry 
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disposition and dated back to the periods of the great depression1. These periods up 
until the 60’5 in the US and 80’s in the EU were characterised by the feelings that 
competition was inimical to the stability of the banking system and the systemic 
well-being as whole and hence saw a complacent regulators and practitioners 
preferring collusion and/or a concentrated banking system. The fact that competition 
might mean allocative efficiency that could help the stability of the system heralded 
the change in this trend that procreated the waves of liberalisation that took place in 
the industry to induce competition. This pattern continued until the recent financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 of which Africa was not left out as since in the 80s structural 
adjustment programs were implemented across SSA as a hallmark for liberalising 
the banking system and putting an end to indigenisation policies that characterised 
the nations after their independence. The financial crisis however brought a mix 
feelings as per the role of competition in bringing about the crisis and in some 
quarters the crisis was blamed on liberalisation and excessive competition in the 
sector (Fu, Lin, & Molyneux, 2014). 
The perception of theories of theories on competition stability views relationship 
emphasis competition been responsible for excessive risk-taking of banks in the loan 
market culminating to the probability of individual bank run and eventual failure2. 
The dominance of the assumption in conventional theories that solving banks 
portfolio problem determined by the allocation of banks assets have in recent 
literature provide plausible evidences of the likelihood of competition been 
favourable to their risk portfolio. It follows that in a competitive banking markets, 
banks face the temptation to offer higher rates in the deposit market while neglecting 
competition in the loan market thus causes earnings to decline. And so, banks more 
often than not have no further options than to take on more risky investments to 
compensate for the lost incomes. Conversely, when faced with competition 
restrictions, banks arrogate market power with the propensity to charge higher 
deposit rates with it attendant high profits. The tendency is that markets become 
uncompetitive with banks overly reluctant to invest in projects that will fetch them 
as much returns as in the deposit market, hence the probability of banks failure 
becomes low if not impossible. Other theoretical models; Matutes and Vives (1996) 
argued bank’s fragility is the result of depositors’ expectation and not necessarily 
due to competition in the market, Matutes and Vives (2000) argued more on the 
effects of regulation and nature of deposit insurance as the main drivers of risk-taking 
attitude of banks, this is also the position of Allen (2004) even though Niinimäki 
(2004) believes that the effects of deposit insurance of risk taking depends on the 
market side competition is taking place. Theory modelling competition on both sides 
of the statement of financial assumes the main preoccupation of banks is solving the 
optimal contraction problem. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) in their work on theory of 
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bank risk-taking and competition argue portfolio problem is transformed to 
contraction problem in the face of moral hazard concluding on competition stability 
view. A non-linear relationship was concluded by Martinez-Miera and Repullo 
(2010) between competition and stability in banks. They argued that’s Boyd and De 
Nicolo (2005) competition-stability view may not hold when loan defaults are 
imperfectly correlated. That intense competition may result in risk- shifting effects, 
reduce borrowers’ default probability but result in margin effects, that is, reduce 
interest payment from performing loan that should serve as buffer against loan 
losses. Measuring competition by the number of banks, they found competition to 
have a U-shaped relationship with bank stability. Their position was that, risk-
shifting effects dominates more concentrated markets such that risk is reduced with 
competition; while margin effects is associated with highly competitive markets that 
erode banks’ franchise values in an increased competitive environment hence 
increase risk.  
Empirical reviews align with the perspectives of theories providing evidences that 
support mixed results in individual and cross country studies. US banks studies found 
both stability (Akins, 2014) and fragility (Hussain & Hassan, 2012; Rhoades & Rutz, 
1982). Results of studies in European banking markets found evidences that majorly 
support stability views, see (Schaeck & Cihak, 2012; Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009) 
among others except Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson (2013) that found a non-linear 
relationship. In Asian countries studies; Fu et al. (2014) found fragility while 
Soedarmono, Machrouh, and Tarazi (2013) support stability. Works in Latin 
America; Tabak et al. (2012) – non-linear relationship and Yeyati and Micco (2007). 
Individual countries evidences reviewed include Spanish Korean and Japanese 
banking sectors for which the authors came to ambiguous conclusions1. Studies that 
were also conducted on cross continental basis had similar conclusions2. The only 
African studies related to competition stability relationship found fragility (Kouki & 
Al-Nasser, 2014). Most of these studies adopted Z-score, distance-to-failure as 
stability measure and lerner index, H-statistics and concentration ratios as 
competition measures. In summary, there is no straight answer for competition and 
stability relationship as shown by evidences around the world. Apart from pockets 
of empirical works that incorporated a number of African countries which 
peradventure will include some SSA region we have found no studies dedicated to 
study this case in SSA region and on commercial banks in particular as they account 
for the largest shares of market and assets of the SSA financial sectors that burdened 
with underdeveloped capital market. It is this gap that this study is out to fill 
especially at a point when policy makers are out to stimulate competition in the 
region’s banking sectors as a catalyst to drive economic growth. 
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3. Methodology 
Extant literature has employed various methods to investigate the relationship 
between competition and stability in the banking system. Notable among these 
methods are OLS1; fixed and random effects regression (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Zhu, 2013; Hussain & Hassan, 2012), among others) and tobit model (Ariss, 
2010). Others include logit model and duration analysis (Schaeck, Cihak, & Simon, 
2009), probit regression (Marques-Ibanez, 2014), 2SLS (Soedarmono et al., 2013), 
granger causality (Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014) and GMM (Berger et al., 2009; Boyd et 
al., 2009) among others). Each of this method have their merits and demerits, 
however we are employing the robust system GMM for this study because of its 
ability to deal with endogeneity issues that is inherent in the regression of stability 
on competition. This makes our study different from Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) 
who studied the implication of market power on stability in Africa with fixed effects 
regression that does not account for endogeneity. Based on the literature reviewed 
and for wants of data in the study area, we are surrogate Lerner index for competition 
and z-score for stability. Lerner index is best at measuring bank level competition 
which makes it a better choice for the study and the fact that it has strong theoretical 
basis. Z-score has wide application in literature and it measures the overall stability 
of the banking sector incorporating most risks that banks may face. 
This studies thus pooled together cross-sectional time series data of the sampled 
banks in the SSA countries under consideration using GMM. The choice of panel 
data analysis is informed by the benefits that the technique offers to the study. 
According to Baltagi (2008), panel analysis accommodates the creation and analysis 
of more difficult behavioural models. Moreover, the technique provides for 
additional degree of freedom, efficient when compared to time series and cross-
sectional data and offers more explanatory analysis. Panel analysis generally meant 
more variability, fewer collinearity and controlled heterogeneity within individual 
data2. 
3.1. Generalised Method of Moments 
The implementation of the regression of the relationship between competition and 
stability in the SSA region commercial banks is done using the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) regression. The prevalence of individual cross-sectional data 
over–time have resulted in the development and the increase in the popularity and/or 
acceptability of panel data techniques. This no double has ignited the application of 
dynamic panel data (DPD) that allows finance and economics experts alike to 
accommodate individual dynamics in their studies. At the same time, the inclusion 
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, 
of lagged endogenous variables in a model where individual effects may be present 
pose a problem of dynamic panel bias (DPB). Regrettably, the conventional DPD 
estimators like; first difference, pooled OLS, GLS, among others are inefficient in 
handling DPB, hence the use of instrumental variables was proposed to alleviate the 
issue of endogeneity in the lagged endogenous variables. In addition, it is a normality 
free regression technique, having great adaptability and data generating process 
assumptions with dependent variables been instrumented by their lagged variables. 
Modelling the relationship between the competition and stability of the commercial 
banks in SSA region with the following linear dynamic panel model; 
               Γit = ρ1Γit−1 + χitρ + Eit                                         (3.1) 
Where i = 1, 2, · · · , N , t = 1, 2, · · · , T , χ
, 
is a (1 × κ) vector of explanatory variables, ρ 
is a (κ × 1) vector of coefficients to be estimated and Eit = γit + ψit; where, γit denotes 
the individual fixed effects capturing individual differences of the cross–sections 
(banks in the sample), and ψit is the idiosyncratic term such that 𝛾 ∼  𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝛿𝛾
2), 𝜓 ∼
 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝛿𝜓
2), assuming that; 
           E [γit] = [γitψit] = 0                                                  (3.2) 
Since Γit brings up DPB given that γit is correlated with Γit, it therefore follows 
that, if Γit is a function of γit, then Γit−1 will also be a function of γit making one 
of the explanatory variables to correlate with one of the composed error terms thus 
given rise to endogeneity problem. 
OLS could not be used to estimate equation (3.2). This is because the 
correlation between Γit−1 and Eit, in other words, E [Γit−1, Eit] > 0, leading 
to overestimation of ρ1 and so the result with be bias upward as well as inconsistent. 
One way to fix this endogeneity bias is to remove the individual fixed effects through 
data transformation. Another way is to look for a valid instrument of the lagged 
endogenous variable. For the purpose of simplicity, let’s assume a model of 
competition and stability relationship with just one regressor; 
             Γit = ρ1Γit−1 + Eit                                                   (3.3) 
Taking one more lag from equation (3.3) will remove individual fixed effects; 
                   Γit−1 = ρ1Γit−2 + Eit−1                        (3.4) 
This gives; 
              (Γit − Γit−1) = ρ1(Γit−1 − Γit−2) + (γi − γi) + (ψit − ψit−1)   (3.5) 
Therefore; 
                            ∆Γit = ρ1∆Γit−1 + ∆ψit                 (3.6) 
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Where ∆ = (1 − L) represents the first difference operator. The problem with the 
transformation is the loss of degree of freedom as T first–period observations is 
dropped which could pose a serious challenge for unbalanced panel data. 
Notwithstanding, in the views of Griliches (1998) the first differencing 
transformation is able to get rid of the individual effects. The transformation has also 
MA(1) for ∆ψit given the assumption of ψ ∼ iidN (0, δ2 ). This hence requires the 
application of GLS that is anle to transform data by means of subtracting the time 
averaged model from equation (3.1); 
                     Γ̅𝑖 =  𝜌1Γ̅𝑡−1 + ?̅?𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖                    (3.7) 
So that the transformed model becomes; 
     (Γ𝑖𝑡 − Γ̅𝑖) = 𝜌1(Γ̅𝑡−1 − Γ̅𝑖,−1) + (𝛾𝑖  −  𝛾𝑖) + (𝜓𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)          (3.8) 
In equation (3.8), (Γ𝑖𝑡 − Γ̅𝑖) is regressed on (Γ̅𝑡−1 − Γ̅𝑖,−1) using OLS within group 
estimator. Although within group estimator manages to eliminate individual effects, 
per Nickell (1981), it is inconsistent due to its inability to deal with dynamic panel 
bias. Thus, makes first difference conversion a better approach than the within group 
conversion in resolving endogeneity issues. For instance, in the first difference 
transformation, on previous error term realised is included in the model, meanwhile, 
in within group conversion, all preceding realisations are incorporated into the 
model. For this reason, all OLS estimators are unable to resolve dynamic panel bias 
and therefore require an alternative approach. 
The works of Anderson and Cheng (1982) among others, argued that the failure of 
the OLS estimator in dealing with the issues arising from the dynamic panel bias 
orchestrated the popularity that instrumental variable estimator gained in literature. 
Equation (3.6) requires instrumental variable estimator for implementation since the 
first difference conversion is unable to recover consistency with the application of 
OLS estimator. To deal with this, Anderson and Cheng (1982) proposed a two stage 
least square (2SLS) approach that is able to utilise the first difference transformation 
to eliminate the fixed effects, as well as employ the lags of the explained variable to 
instrument the transformed lag endogenous variable. The essence is that, since Γit, a 
component of ∆Γit−1 is correlated with Eit−1 which is also contained in ∆Eit, then 
the deeper lags of the explanatory variables are not correlated with the error term, as 
such could be used as instrument. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) proposed Γit−2 to be 
used as instrument for ∆Γit−1 because it is correlated with Γit−1 − Γit − 2 but 
orthogonal to ∆Eit if error terms are assumed not to be serially correlated. Be that as 
it may, 2SLS does not utilise all the valid instruments available, thus suffers similar 
setback as the OLS - not efficient. 
Consequently, the generalised method of moments GMM proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991) is applied to efficiently and consistently estimate the relationship 
between competition and stability of SSA region commercial banks in equation (3.1). 
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GMM can take equations both in first difference and in levels with its specific sets 
of instrumental variables. To deal with banks specific effects, first difference is taken 
as in equation (3.5) and the utilisation of the appropriate lag instruments needed 
resolves the issues of the correlation between Γit − Γit−1 and ψit − ψit−1. The same 
approach is deployed to generate instruments for other regressors that are permitted 
to be dependent on the past and the current realisation of the explained variable. 
Given the assumptions that regressors are weakly exogenous and that the error term 
is devoid of serial correlation, dynamic GMM employs the following moments 
conditions; 
       E [Γi,jt−s· (Ei,jt − Ei,jt−1)] = 0  for s ≥ 2,  t = 2, · · · T            (3.9) 
        E [χi,jt−s· (Ei,jt − Ei,jt−1)] = 0  for s ≥ 2,  t = 2, · · · T             (3.10) 
The outcomes of the above moments of condition produces the first difference 
GMM. One major drawback associated with this is that, where the lagged 
endogenous variables and the regressors are persistent overtime, there is every 
likelihood that the lagged levels may be weak instrument for the first differenced 
variables. Hence, amount to finite bias with reduced accuracy culminating to the 
need to regress at levels as well to complement the regression at the first differences. 
The lagged first differences instrument the regression in levels of the same variables. 
So that additional moments of condition for the regression in levels are as stated 
below. 
           E [(Γi,jt−s − Γi,jt−s−1) · (γi + Ei,jt−1)] = 0  for s = 1             (3.11) 
         E [(χi,jt−s − χi,jt−s−1) · (γi + Ei,jt−1)] = 0  for s = 1             (3.12) 
We however applied the orthogonal deviation of Arellano and Bover (1995) which 
Roodman (2006) argues to be more applicable in the case of an unbalanced panels 
with pockets of missing data. To be consistent, the instrument of the GMM 
regressors must be valid. This is verified through the Hansen J statistics in a robust 
estimation1. Also, test of serial correlation among the error terms is required for a 
valid GMM results. Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation assumes no serial 
correlation and its applied to the differenced residuals. Once the null hypothesis is 
acceptable order two, inferring the absence of serial correlation, the study will then 
employ corresponding moment of conditions. 
To estimate the relationship between competition and stability of SSA region 
commercial banks therefore we employ the following estimation equation; 
       Zkit = βkit + Zkit−1 + πkitLIkit + ζkitΣXkit + ξkit                (3.13) 
Where Ykit measures the stability for bank i in country k at year t. βkit is a constant; 
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πkit is the coefficient of competition measure, LI, for k s regression in year t ; ζkit is 
the coefficient of the vector of bank specific variables and other 
macroeconomics/non-financial variables; ξkit is the error term. 
3.2. Data and Variable Description 
Data for this study were mainly sourced from BankScope that is considered to 
house the most comprehensive database on banks. We employed an unbalanced 
panel of 440 commercial banks from 2006 to 2015 to account for entry and exit and 
also cater for periods of data unavailability. The focus on commercial banks ensure 
uniformity in our choice of banks as quite a good number of other deposit money 
banks still enjoy government support at one time or the other. Data requirement for 
the estimation of lerner index, competition variable that were collected include 
personnel expenses, total assets, total revenue, interest and non-interest expense, 
fixed assets and total deposits. For stability measure, Zscore, we collected equity 
capital ratio (ECR) and return of assets (ROA). Other data collected include Return 
on equity (ROE), pre-tax income, GDP annual growth rate and corruption 
perception. The GDP annual growth rate is available from WDI of World Bank 
while corruption perception is from Transparency International. We followed 
literature in carefully selecting the combination of variables that are used in this 
study. We limit our measure of stability to Zscore1 in this study for want of 
comprehensive data of non-performing loans on commercial banks. This study 
follow the procedure for computation of lerner index as contained in (Kouki & Al-
Nasser, 2014). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
We present the results of the relationship between competition and stability of SSA 
countries commercial banks in this section. Competition is measured using Lerner 
index that has the ability to capture bank level market power. We surrogate stability 
with Zscore. Zscore has been used in literature as a stability test for banks and 
banking sector stability, measured based on banks performance in terms of 
employed in ration to their capital. Ongoing results in literature provide evidences 
that competition may be good or bad for the banking sectors. Specifically, empirical 
works have supported stability and fragility of banking sector due to competition. 
Most of this debates have largely been domiciled in the advanced world of US and 
Europe with pockets of literature in emerging markets like China. We do not expect 
the SSA commercial banking markets to behave differently, more so with the level 
of development in the region, and the recent crisis5 that have been partly blamed 
on excessive competition. To this end, we hypothesis that competition may have 
contributed significantly to such instability in this part of the world6. In the next 
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three subsections are the summary statistics providing insight to the data used in 
this study, the correlation results which though not an econometrics analysis, gives 
a precursor to what the econometrics analysis might be, and finally the regression 
analysis results. 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Authors’ computation, 2017 
In Table 1 is the summary statistics. This is to provide an insight into the nature of 
data used in the study. The four columns immediately to the right of the first two 
columns in the table relates exclusively to the competition measure. Lerner index is 
a measure of market power that range from 0 to 1, with indices close to 1 signifying 
high market power and/or low degree of competition/concentration in the banking 
sector. Banks at this end of the markets are said to be oligopolistic or at the extreme, 
monopoly. Whereas, indices close to zero denotes low market and/or high 
competition, with banks either competing in monopolistic banking market or faced 
with perfect competition7. We found market power to range almost between 0.355E-
04 in 2013 and 0.998E-01 in 2012 giving the minimum and the maximum indices 
across the 440 banks considered over the study period of 2006 - 20015. This 
momentarily suggest a mixture of high and low market power. However, further 
analysis by the mean and the standard deviation suggest a highly competitive 
commercial banking sector having mean of market power that are below 0.50. The 
means are closer to the minimum than the maximum in all the years considered and 
the standard deviation substantiated our claim by not been fundamental far from the 
mean. The other parts of the Table are the mean of Zscore suggesting a rather stable 
sector; size, representing the log of total assets used as a control variable; equity 
capital ratio, which is the ratio of capital to total assets and most times used to denote 
regulatory capital; return on assets, return on equity and pre–tax income to total 
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assets ratio, as performance measures. Others include the means of GDP annual 
growth and corruption perception. 
4.3. Econometrics Analysis  
We regressed stability on competition and provided other variables as contained in 
literature to explain the stability of the commercial banking sector in the SSA region. 
We also provide the correlation results among variables in Table 2. Our main 
objective is to measure the impact of competition on stability in SSA Commercial 
banks. The essence of the other variables is to also look at other factors that may also 
impact on stability and so the emphasis will be on competition and stability 
relationship. 
Table 2. Correlation Result 
Authors’ estimation, 2017 
Although we had provided some motivation for using dynamic panel data analysis 
in this study via GMM, we still however, begin this analysis from the standpoint of 
static to dynamic analysis, hence the presentation of OLS, fixed effects (FE) and 
random effects (RE) model results as contained in Table 4 and the outcome produced 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
zscore & lerner 
index 
-0.1346 -0.2072 -
0.0259 
-0.0098 -
0.3066 
-
0.3131 
-
0.2533 
0.0038 -
0.0681 
-0.0174 
p-value 0.0640 0.0023 0.6834 0.8715 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9409 0.1586 0.7166 
zscore & size -0.4253 -0.2936 -
0.3279 
-0.2966 -
0.1474 
-
0.0913 
-
0.1588 
-
0.2291 
-
0.3007 
-0.2238 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0111 0.1031 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
zscore & eqcapratio 0.9478 0.9480 0.7938 0.8324 0.8105 0.8167 0.6661 0.5692 0.6157 0.6990 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
zscore & roa 0.1778 0.2587 0.3241 0.1765 0.3096 0.5014 0.3173 0.2496 0.3083 0.5687 
p-value 0.0141 0.0001 0.0000 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
zscore & roe 0.0650 -0.0466 0.0490 0.0224 0.1126 0.0175 0.0990 0.0958 0.0883 0.0895 
p-value 0.3751 0.4991 0.4443 0.7131 0.0546 0.7564 0.0621 0.0585 0.0683 0.0608 
zscore & pbtaratio 0.0860 0.1767 0.2094 0.0805 0.1910 0.3483 0.0821 0.1303 0.0589 0.4823 
p-value 0.2383 0.0094 0.0009 0.1831 0.0010 0.0000 0.1215 0.0098 0.2229 0.0000 
zscore & cop 0.1158 -0.0587 0.0541 -0.0115 0.0865 0.0918 0.0448 0.0889 0.1023 0.1291 
p-value 0.128 0.4057 0.4073 0.8541 0.1685 0.1183 0.4186 0.0789 0.0339 0.0071 
zscore & GDPG -0.0215 -0.0165 -
0.0713 
0.0853 0.0069 0.0532 -
0.0787 
-
0.0177 
-
0.1646 
-0.0532 
p-value 0.7701 0.8102 0.2613 0.1582 0.9065 0.3427 0.1379 0.7262 0.0006 0.2772 
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a rather interesting result. The dynamic panel model employs the robust two-step 
system GMM with orthogonal deviation, the results displayed in column 4 of Table 
3. This has been proven to resolve panel data bias with the ability to handle 
unbalanced panel data analysis. we found the lagged value of ZSCORE to be positive 
Table 3. Regression Results 
 
 
VARIABLES 
OLS Model 
zscore 
FE Model 
zscore 
RE Model 
zscore 
GMM Model 
zscore 
L.zscore 
 
 
li 
 
 
 
-0.0322*** 
 
 
 
-0.00904*** 
 
 
 
-0.0105*** 
0.394*** 
-0.117 
-0.0260*** 
 (0.00562) (0.00303) (0.00305) (0.00887) 
lnabv -0.209*** -0.350*** -0.322*** -0.0971 
 
eqcapratio 
 
 
roa 
(0.024) 
10.34*** 
(0.199) 
26.93*** 
(1.37) 
(0.0404) 
12.58*** 
(0.201) 
15.28*** 
(1.084) 
(0.0339) 
12.08*** 
(0.189) 
16.42*** 
(1.043) 
(0.106) 
7.950** 
(3.701) 
30.02*** 
(8.931) 
roe -0.00263*** 0.000187 0.000108 -0.00252 
 
pbtaratio 
 
 
cop 
-0.000995 
-5.531*** 
(1.335) 
0.0141*** 
(0.00344) 
-0.000571 
6.163*** 
(1.045) 
0.0171*** 
(0.00539) 
-0.000566 
4.945*** 
(1.008) 
0.0163*** 
(0.00468) 
-0.00197 
-18.21*** 
(6.635) 
0.00870* 
(0.00487) 
gdpg -0.462 -0.514 -0.476 -0.112 
 (0.932) (0.51) (0.509) (0.519) 
Constant 3.626*** 4.845*** 4.650*** 1.589 
 (0.329) (0.471) (0.42) (1.376) 
 
Observations 
 
2,955 
 
2,955 
 
2,955 
 
2,552 
R-squared 0.612 0.727   
Number of id  438 438 425 
Wald (chi2)    1030.31 
Prob > chi2    0.000 
AR2    0.136 
Hansen J Stat.    0.522 
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Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
and significant signifying that stability in the past periods has a considerable effect 
in ensuring current period stability. In fact, it has an impact of up to 0.3% on the 
current banking stability. Similar to the two previous models, competition as 
measured by Lerner index is has inverse but significant relationship with stability. 
In other words, if competition increases, stability goes down. EQCAPRATIO, ROA 
and COP are also consistent with previous models as the coefficients that are 
significant and positive with stability reiterating the fact that banks capital base, 
return on assets and corruption signalling effects are important determinant of bank 
stability. Our results in terms of stability and capitalisation relationship therefore 
does not support Kouki and Al-Nasser (2014) that found capitalisation as not only 
insignificant with ZSCORE but also negative. Unlike the fixed effect model, ROE is 
negative but not significant, PBTARATIO is significantly negative showing 
consistency with the OLS result. Again, GDP annual growth shows no significant 
and negative relationship with stability, this is consistent across the three models. 
Given that the robustness of the panel data estimation, our discussions on economic 
implication will be based on the GMM results. To begin with, the persistent, positive 
and significant relationship of stability in the immediate past period with the present 
reflects the fact that stability in the past is fundamental for the current and future 
periods stability. This is a wakeup call for an unrelenting effort  in ensuring a stable 
banking environment at all time for the smooth running of the monetary economic 
system as in the words of Vives (2016), the banking system is so pivotal to an 
economy to the extent that the modern monetary economy stops functioning with 
bank failure. That been said, this study found a negative and significant relationship 
between ZSCORE and LERNERI. In other words, stability is negatively related to 
competition as measure by the Lerner index in the SSA region commercial banks. 
We had reported a monopolistic competitive banking market given the outcome of 
the commercial banks’ market power computation in the SSA region. This result 
suggests that competition is associated with instability and consistent with the 
competition fragility view of Yeyati and Micco (2007) in a study of 8 Latin American 
countries between 1993–2002; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) in 79 
countries between 1994–2009; Fu et al. (2014) in a study of 14 Asian countries from 
2003–2010; Agoraki et al. (2011) who studied  13 CCE countries between 1998–
2005 and Ariss (2010) who studied 60 developing countries that included 14 African 
countries. Most of this studies had employed both Lerner index as Zscore to measure 
competition and stability respective making our study directly comparable to theirs. 
Although, at the moment, our data; bank capital base, bank performance and the 
stability measure estimated, the ZSCORE, do not suggest any form of instability in 
the commercial banking sectors of the SSA region, however, banks in this region 
continues to face the risk of high non-performing loans NPLs among others in their 
asset portfolios. These are likely to arise from undue competition that makes banks 
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to either wave or not to pay proper attention to processes of KYC and other corporate 
governance issues that arises during selection of loan assets portfolio. Knowing that 
potential instability is associated with competition in this region is a call for caution 
among players, regulators and practitioners alike, so that their priorities should be 
aligned to avoid such eventualities. A point to note is that the proponents of 
competition stability view emphasis the role of efficiency in the relationship between 
competition and stability. this we have not taken account of in this study and might 
require further investigation in the case of the SSA region. 
The emphasis on banks’ capital base and why it is made as the cardinal point of 
regulation is justified by the direct influence it has on the stability of the banking 
system as found in this study. As such banks, must at all time maintain an adequate 
and sound capital base to withstand stress and provide cushion for it survival. We 
noted from the results that only the return on assets among the performance measures 
employed is significant and has direct relationship to explaining stability in the SSA 
region commercial banks. It is not clear at this point why return on equity is negative 
but not significant to explain stability and also why pre–tax income is significantly 
negative in explaining stability of banks in the region. Hence, we briefly like to draw 
the attention of stakeholders in this region this and a need for further studies as well. 
GDP annual growth proxying economic growth is al seen to be insignificant to 
explain the stability of the commercial banking sector of the SSA region. The 
expectation is that growth in an economic should impact positively to improve the 
well-being of the people in terms of per capital income. Likewise, industry should 
grow which ultimately should reduce the cost of banking as well as loan default rates 
hence stability. However, the case of SSA region suggests otherwise. More often 
than not most SSA countries statistically report growth in their economy annually 
but what is seen has been as the growth increase so does the level of poverty and 
underdevelopment. Providing evidences that economic growth might not explain 
stability in the region since it could not support the necessary parameters that should 
culminate in the stability of the banking system. The correlation results above 
support this view as both variables are weakly negatively correlated. Government 
have works to do in this area ensuring economic growth statistical parameters reflect 
the status quo and work assiduously to improve it. Finally, it will make sense to 
increase anti-corruption crusades in the region given that our result suggest that 
corruption perception plays a significant role in the stability of banks. 
Overall, our result meet the various requirements of the regression models as shown 
in Table 3. In particular, for the GMM, the overall fitness of the result is good 
indicated by the Wald test probability, AR2 confirms the absence of serial correlation 
and the result of the Hansen J statistics gives us the confidence that the instruments 
are not overidentified. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
This study looked at competition and stability relationship in the SSA region 
commercial banks in the light of the call to increase competition of the banking 
system in the region to fight poverty through stimulating economic growth. Models 
that we reviewed argue for and against competition and stability, expressing that 
competition may be good and bad for the banking system. The study employed the 
robust orthogonalized version of the Generalised method of Moments to analyse this 
relationship. The choice of methods is to avoid the shortfalls of OLS while 
accounting for possible endogeneity issues between competition and stability. We 
proxy competition with the Lerner index and stability with the Zscore. Both 
measures have been used prominently in this kind of literature and has continued to 
gain relevance. The study concludes based on the findings that competition is 
detrimental to the commercial banking sector of the SSA region. This is a departure 
from Moyo, Nandwa, Council, Oduor, and Simpasa (2014)’s results that found 
otherwise in the SSA region among other studies done elsewhere around the world. 
However, their study differs from ours in the sense that they looked at competition 
and stability vis-a-vis efficiency and we suggest further investigations in these areas. 
Based on the conclusion we might one to recommend caution in the way policies are 
directed towards increasing competition further in the region pending further studies 
factoring efficiency into competition stability relationship in the region is carried 
out. This Study contribute to the literature of competition and stability in Africa as 
this as far as we know is the second empirical works focusing on this region. 
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